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Scorched Atmospheres: The Violent Geographies of
the VietnamWar and the Rise of Drone Warfare
Ian G. R. Shaw
School of Geographical and Earth Sciences, The University of Glasgow
This article explores the violent geographies of the VietnamWar. It argues that the conflict is crucial for under-
standing the security logics and spatialities of U.S. state violence in the war on terror. An overarching theme is
that U.S. national security has inherited and intensified the atmospheric forms of power deployed across South-
east Asia, including ecological violence, the electronic battlefield, counterinsurgency (the Phoenix Program),
and drone surveillance. All of these attempted to pacify and capture hostile circulations of life and place them
within the secured and rationalized interiors of the U.S. war machine. The article thus expands on the concept
of atmospheric warfare. This is defined as a biopolitical project of enclosure to surveil, secure, and destroy
humans and nonhumans within a multidimensional warscape. Since modern state power is becoming ever
more atmospheric—particularly with the rise of drone warfare—dissecting the origins of that violence in the
VietnamWar is a vital task. Key Words: biopolitics, security, Vietnam War, violence, war on terror.
本文探索越战的暴力地理。本文主张,冲突是理解美国在反恐战争中的安全逻辑与国家暴力的空间性之
关键。总体的主题是, 美国国家安全已继承并强化了其于东南亚所部署的大气权力形式, 包含生态暴
力、电子战场、反叛乱 (凤凰计画),以及无人机监控。这些形式的目的皆在于企图安抚并捕捉怀有敌意
的生命循环,并将之置放于安全且合理化的美国战争机器内部。本文从而扩张大气战事的概念。该概念
定义为在多维战争地景中,监控、保卫并摧毁人类及非人类的围堵生命政治计画。随着现代国家权力愈
发大气化——特别是无人机战事的兴起——仔细研究此般暴力于越战中的起源,便是一项极为重要的工
作。关键词：生命政治,安全,越战,暴力,反恐战争。
Este artıculo explora las geografıas violentas de la Guerra de Vietnam. Se arguye que el conflicto es crucial para
entender la logica de seguridad y las espacialidades de la violencia de estado de los EE.UU. en la guerra al terror.
Tema crucial es que la seguridad nacional de los EE.UU. ha heredado e intensificado las formas atmosfericas del
poder desplegadas a traves del Sudeste Asiatico, incluyendo la violencia ecologica, la guerra electronica, con-
trainsurgencia (el Programa Fenix) y la vigilancia con drones. Con todas estas cosas se intento pacificar y cap-
turar circulaciones hostiles de vida y colocarlas dentro de los interiores seguros y racionalizados de la maquina
de guerra de los EE.UU. Por eso, el artıculo se extiende sobre el concepto de guerra atmosferica. Tal cosa se
define como un proyecto biopolıtico de encierro para vigilar, asegurar y destruir humanos y no humanos dentro
de un paisaje belico multidimensional. Puesto que el poder en el estado moderno se ha hecho cada vez mas
atmosferico—en particular con el advenimiento de la guerra de drones—analizar minuciosamente los orıgenes
de esa violencia en la Guerra de Vietnam es una tarea vital. Palabras clave: biopolıtica, seguridad, Guerra de
Vietnam, violencia, guerra al terror.
O
n 30 April 1975, U.S. helicopters evacuated
thousands of U.S. and Vietnamese personnel
from across Saigon in chaotic scenes that were
broadcast on television screens around the world.
Operation Frequent Wind, as it was called, marked
the unofficial end of the Vietnam War, which had
continued for two years after President Nixon with-
drew U.S. troops. At its peak in 1968, there were more
than half a million U.S. soldiers stationed in the coun-
try. Many were reluctant draftees, catapulted into an
amorphous conflict with shifting objectives. Indeed,
the Vietnam War is difficult to contain to a single
time or space: Its history stretches back to French colo-
nialism and its geography bleeds into insurgencies
fought in Laos and Cambodia. Yet despite being one
of the longest wars in U.S. history, second only to the
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unyielding war on terror, the violent geographies engi-
neered in the Vietnam War have remained relatively
unexamined in political geography (exceptions
include Power 2001; Gregory 2011b; Bowd and Clay-
ton 2013; Clayton 2013). However, the conflict trig-
gered a series of important evolutions in the conduct
of U.S. state violence that this article investigates.
The Vietnam War, or the Second Indochina War,
was part of a wider campaign of U.S. proxy wars, black
ops, and direct military conflicts pursued during the
Cold War. Motivated by the flawed domino theory,
President Kennedy committed the United States on a
crusade to contain Ho Chi Minh’s brand of nationalist
communism in the early 1960s, when he sent special
advisers to Saigon. Over the next decade, a total of
58,200 U.S. soldiers and 2 million Vietnamese died in
the conflict. In neighboring Laos and Cambodia, an
additional 2 million people were killed in insurgencies
bound to the U.S. conflict. By 1975, 879,000 orphans
and 1 million war widows dwelt in overcrowded urban
slums, and a further 1.5 million fled the country alto-
gether (Wiest 2002). Thousands of former South Viet-
namese military personnel were also disappeared or
confined to reeducation camps after Saigon fell. The
violent geographies of U.S. military intervention thus
endured long after U.S. troops left Southeast Asia
(Figure 1). Beneath the shadows of returning Huey
helicopters lay a wounded landscape, a scarred society,
and the geopolitical conditions for decades of
“blowback” in the region (Johnson 2002), particularly
in the killing fields of Cambodia.
Of course, although U.S. troops might well have left
behind a bloody legacy, many carried home their own
personal hell, returning to a war-weary public in the
throes of the civil rights movement and a tectonic
shift in social mores. For all of these reasons, any anal-
ysis of the Vietnam War must excavate incomplete
ruins and contradictory stories. Yet several important
geographies emerge from the rubble of America’s lost
war. These are important for understanding the prac-
tice of contemporary state power, which has become
increasingly atmospheric (Elden 2013; Adey 2014).
An obvious example today is the securing of national
airspace with military satellites, planes, drones, and
even blimps (Williams 2010). These aerial technolo-
gies allow the state to access—and render transpar-
ent—the material and electronic circulations of life,
which curl together in hybrid, more-than-human ecol-
ogies. U.S. national security has not only inherited but
also intensified various forms of atmospheric warfare
deployed in Vietnam.
The first form of atmospheric warfare this article
investigates is the use of ecological weapons—such as
Agent Orange and napalm—to poison, burn, and
destroy the lived environment. This is important for
establishing the centrality of geography to the conduct
of U.S. military strategy in Vietnam. The second proj-
ect is the U.S. military’s so-called electronic battlefield
(Dickson 2012). This was a sophisticated network of
electronic sensors, airplanes, and computers that
detected enemy movements in the forest and auto-
mated the military’s kill chain. Unlike the scorched
earth strategy of defoliation, the electronic battlefield
enclosed the enemy’s lifeworld inside a simulated,
cybernetic environment. Related to this was the U.S.–
South Vietnamese counterinsurgency project called
the Phoenix Program (Valentine 2000). This appara-
tus placed insurgents inside a bureaucratic world of
manhunting and pacification. The entrenchment of
targeted killing within the war on terror marks a cru-
cial line of descent. The final form of atmospheric war-
fare investigated is the deployment of Lightning Bug
drones across North Vietnam. These unprecedented
surveillance missions were a formative period in the
emerging “dronification of state violence” (Shaw and
Akhter 2014).
Rather than present a military history of these proj-
ects, this article explores how they each produced a
mode of atmospheric warfare that sought to enclose,
police, and pacify hostile forms of life. As such, it brings
our attention to the immersive, ecological, and at times
suffocating apparatuses of state power. By combining
Figure 1. U.S. soldiers are airlifted by UH-1D helicopters on 16
May 1966. Source: U.S. National Archives, Identifier Number
530610. High-resolution image taken from Wikimedia Commons
(https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:UH-1D_helicopters_in_
Vietnam_1966.jpg). (Color figure available online.)
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the historical and the theoretical, the article not only
recognizes the importance of “the temporal and spatial
specificity of security logics” (Browning and McDonald
2011, 242) but also contributes to emerging debates in
political geography, international relations, and critical
security studies on the links between violence and the
physical architectures of state power (Holmqvist 2013;
Schouten 2013; Srnicek, Fotou, and Arghand 2013).
More specifically, there has been a growing interest in
the relationship between conflict and its material geog-
raphies (Le Billon 2001; Francis 2014; Gregory forth-
coming), such that “it is no longer possible to treat war
and environment as separate realms” (Pearson 2012,
125). By expanding on what we think of as an atmo-
sphere—to include technical forms of enclosure and
immersion—the article concludes by arguing that
drone warfare has come to symbolize a fundamentally
enclosed technological civilization.
Enclosing Life
Despite the novelty of aerial technologies such as
Predator drones, state power has always been invested
in surveilling and engineering the lived environment.
Foucault (1977), for example, asserted that state power
and violence are always-already etched into the mate-
rial organization of space. His analysis begins in seven-
teenth-century Europe, when deviant individuals were
disciplined through state enclosures, including prisons,
asylums, schools, factories, and barracks. From this
archipelago of hypersecured “insides,” the entire social
field was slowly surveilled under a “generalizable
mechanism of ‘panopticism’” (Foucault 1977, 216). In
turn, this disciplinary power—which fixed docile bod-
ies inside of state-sanctioned architectures—was sup-
plemented by what Foucault termed a biopolitical
power in the second half of the eighteenth century.
This targeted the human being as a living, breathing,
animal, “taking control of life and the biological pro-
cesses of man-as-species” (Foucault 2003, 246–47).
Biopower seeks to control the milieu of the human
species, including “the direct effects of the geographi-
cal, climatic, or hydrographic environment” (Foucault
2003, 245).
Biopower is thus a profoundly atmospheric power: It
targets the voluminous spaces of human existence,
from the soil beneath our feet to the skies above our
heads. The twentieth century intensified this atmo-
spheric power, and “will be remembered as the age
whose essential thought consisted in targeting no
longer the body, but the enemy’s environment” (Slo-
terdijk 2009, 14). No longer did the state focus on the
minds and bodies of recalcitrant individuals: It came
to occupy and engineer the wider atmosphere. As Fei-
genbaum and Kanngieser (2015, 81) argued, “This
attunement to the air as an agential feature of political
control does well to capture how military and state
operatives treat the atmosphere as measurable and
open to manipulation.” Atmospheric power, in short,
crystallizes the state’s ability to enclose—sometimes
violently—the atmospheres in which living beings are
born, become, and die: “biopolitics begins as enclo-
sure-building” (Sloterdijk 2013, 170).
Despite their apparent diversity, each of the four
types of atmospheric warfare deployed in Vietnam can
therefore be understood as biopolitical projects of
enclosure. Whether ecological violence, electronic
war, manhunting, or drone surveillance, each
attempted to enclose the hostile circulations of life
within the secured, rationalized interiors of the U.S.
war machine. The state’s use of the atmosphere, as a
medium for travel, surveillance, and violence, is now
an essential feature of modern conflict, and represents
what Sloterdijk (2009, 53) called “the ecologization of
warfare.” Atmospheric warfare is thus an outgrowth of
a mode of state power that is fundamentally concerned
with targeting and occupying the lifeworld.
But what exactly is an atmosphere? Atmospheres
are hybrid or more-than-human envelopes of exis-
tence, “spatially discharged affective qualities that are
autonomous from the bodies that they emerge from,
enable, and perish with” (Anderson 2009, 80). In
other words, an atmosphere is a space, or a volume, of
hybrid materials and forces. Atmospheres are con-
structed—and policed—not simply by human modes
of existence but the force-full and affective qualities of
objects (Meehan, Shaw, and Marston 2013; Shaw and
Meehan 2013). An attention to the atmospheric thus
extends our understanding of the spatiality of state
power, adding a height, depth, and more-than-human
materiality to our geographical registers (see Klauser
2010). Indeed, this kind of vertical geopolitics
“requires an Escher-like representation of space, a ter-
ritorial hologram in which political acts of manipula-
tion and multiplication of the territory transform a
two-dimensional surface into a three-dimensional vol-
ume” (Weizman 2002).
The Vietnam War marks a crucial moment in the
history of atmospheric warfare. On the one hand, the
U.S. military destroyed countless lived environments,
pulverizing plants, people, animals, rivers, and trees
The Violent Geographies of the VietnamWar and the Rise of Drone Warfare 3
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(Figure 2). The U.S. Air Force even tried to modify the
Vietnamese climate to induce devastating typhoons.
This form of atmospheric warfare was a distinctly geo-
graphical mode of violence that reengineered the Viet-
namese landscape to meet the abstract blueprints of the
U.S. military’s war (Lacoste 1973; see also Bowd and
Clayton 2013). In other words, it sought to remake the
environment through physical terraforming or terror-
forming. The conflict also inaugurated forms of atmo-
spheric power that enclosed the biopolitical landscape
indirectly, however, using technical apparatuses. This
includes the electronic battlefield, the bureaucratic
world of the Phoenix Program, and the aerial surveil-
lance orbits of Lightning Bug drones. This means that
atmospheric warfare must be understood as both ecologi-
cal and electronic, collapsing physical and virtual surfa-
ces inside of moving volumes of state power.
Although actor-network theory has continually
brought attention to the objects and relationships that
produce state power (Latour 2005), atmospheric power
highlights the spheres, encasings, and enclosures that
wrap themselves around the terrain, containing
humans and nonhumans within hybrid, multidimen-
sional warscapes. “Thinking through atmospheres,”
explained Adey (2014, 835), “helps us to extrude net-
worked security into immersive enveloping shapes in
which the subjects in and of security might be caught.
Thus, understanding a security dispotif through
atmosphere is to attend to the multiple, expressive,
and enveloping spatialities it produces and seeks to
capture.” In other words, atmospheric warfare seeks to
capture, reengineer, and at times eliminate the circula-
tion, shape, and spaces of life. Indeed, as will become
clear, the Vietnam War offers a deep, even existential
reflection on the precarious link between human exis-
tence and the environment.
The Colonial Inheritance
Since U.S. state violence is becoming ever more
atmospheric, revisiting its early beginnings in the mud
and blood of Vietnam is crucial. Yet the Vietnam War
was never simply a U.S. war. The conflict emerged from
colonial conditions present long before U.S. Marines
deployed on the beaches of Da Nang in 1965. During
the nineteenth century, France colonized Southeast
Asia and created what was known as French Indochina,
composed of the Vietnamese regions of Cochinchina,
Annam, and Tonkin, as well as Laos and Cambodia.
The French imposed a series of land reforms that con-
verted vast swathes of Vietnam into rubber plantations.
Particularly in the southern colony of Cochinchina,
this produced a landless proletariat dependent on a
small, foreign-backed elite. In short, the political geog-
raphy of French colonialism sharpened the division
between north and south (Fitzgerald 1972). Annam,
and later Tonkin, subsequently became hotbeds for a
growing anticolonial struggle during the 1920s.
Japan’s invasion of Vietnam during World War II
and France’s resulting capitulation spurred the growing
nationalist cause. In 1941, Ho Chi Minh founded the
Vietminh to combat the Japanese occupation and over-
throw the French colonial administration. By 1945, the
Vietminh had succeeded and moved into Hanoi to pro-
claim the free Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Fol-
lowingWorldWar II, however, the French—backed by
their British allies—swiftly reoccupied Cochinchina,
regaining control of Hanoi in 1947. The Vietminh scat-
tered into the countryside and began a long campaign
of insurgency. Despite overwhelming technological
superiority, the French met decisive defeat at the battle
of Dien Bien Phu in 1954, where some 12,000 French
soldiers surrendered. “What the Vietminh had lacked
in techno-capital they made up for by mobilizing peo-
ple” (Gibson 2000, 64).
Peace negotiations followed in 1954, with the
Geneva Accords temporarily dividing the country
along its seventeenth parallel and mandating an
Figure 2. U.S. napalm bombs explode in South Vietnam, 1965.
Source: U.S. National Archives, Identifier Number 542328. (Color
figure available online.)
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election to reunify the country in 1956. During the
armistice, the Vietminh moved into the north and
consolidated their government in Hanoi. Meanwhile,
in the south, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
backed the controversial figure of Ngo Dinh Diem.
Staunchly anticommunist, Diem’s autocratic regime
gained its power from the Catholic emigres who had
fled to Saigon from the north. Diem balked at the
Geneva Accords in 1955, and the United States—
fearing a communist landslide victory—threw its sup-
port behind his Republic of Vietnam. For the next
eight years, the United States would support a dictator
whose unpopular policies—land reform, taxation,
forced resettlement, repression of Buddhists, and ter-
roristic anticommunist laws—would alienate the wider
peasant population.
In response, Vietminh fighters who had stayed in
the south, together with other groups that opposed the
Saigon government, established the National Libera-
tion Front (NLF) in 1960, gaining de facto control of
the countryside. Throughout the war the NLF was sup-
ported by Hanoi’s conventional, Soviet-backed army,
the North Vietnamese Army (NVA), which was led
by General Vo Nguyen Giap. In effect, the Vietminh
and the NLF were both crystallizations of a single, rev-
olutionary arc. No matter how hard the U.S. military
fought, and no matter how superior its war machines
were, it could never escape this stubborn truth. Yet
the anticolonial struggle was not at the forefront of
the minds of the U.S. war managers. Obsessed with
the idea that communism was a monolithic force, the
nuances of the Vietnam conflict were erased (Turse
2013). As such, the U.S. military, in support of its Sai-
gon client state, faced an armed uprising it scarcely
comprehended.
Initially, under the direction of General Westmore-
land, the conflict was managed as a war of attrition.
Rather than hold territory, the U.S. military sought to
grind down enemy numbers in search-and-destroy mis-
sions. This was a defining feature of the Vietnam War
in its early years: U.S. soldiers would drop down from a
helicopter, fight over a contested hill, ravine, or fire-
base, and then be evacuated after the battle. Karl Mar-
lantes, a decorated U.S. Marine, put it best in his
celebrated war novel, Matterhorn: “People who didn’t
even know each other were going to kill each other
over a hill none of them cared about” (Marlantes
2010, 343). By viewing victory in terms of disparate
body counts, the war was being fought as a patchwork
of pointillist conflicts. “Westmoreland was trying to
play chess while his enemy was playing Go” (Fitzgerald
1972, 343). The lack of a territorial basis meant the
progress of the war was difficult for the military to mea-
sure. It also suited the Maoist-style tactics of NLF gue-
rillas, who melted away into the forest only to later
reemerge.
By 1968, the NLF numbered some 400,000 men,
women, and children (Wiest 2002). Washington’s lim-
ited war, designed to prevent the Saigon government
from falling into communist hands, was turning into a
forever war against an enemy that few Americans
even saw. Change was afoot after the so-called Tet
Offensive of February 1968. This attack against South
Vietnam’s major cities terminally weakened the NLF
as a fighting force, killing 58,000 out of 84,000 troops
(Wiest 2002). But scenes of urban war in the heart of
Saigon were highly symbolic to a U.S. public growing
disaffected with a faraway conflict. Moreover, the Tet
Offensive contradicted government assurances that a
U.S. victory was imminent. On 3 July 1968, months
after the My Lai massacre, General Abrams replaced
Westmoreland as the new commander of the U.S mili-
tary in Vietnam. He changed U.S. tactics and inaugu-
rated a “One War” strategy aimed at securing
Vietnamese villages and eliminating the so-called
NLF shadow government. Yet despite this change,
throughout the war the U.S. military ran a long cam-
paign of ecological violence that directly targeted
Vietnam’s forests.
Geographical Warfare: Wounding the
Land
Many remember the Vietnam War for the unprece-
dented use of chemical weapons designed to clear the
landscape. Yet this relationship between violence and
the environment has persisted since the dawn of
humanity. Perhaps all that has changed is the scale,
intensity, and technical complexity of this relation-
ship. For example, in their study of forests in Indone-
sia, Malaysia, and Thailand, Peluso and Vandergeest
(2011, 604) argued that “it is difficult to understand
the ecological and political lives of contemporary for-
ests without understanding their connections to Cold
War-era insurgencies and counterinsurgencies” (see
also Clayton 2013). This reflects a broadening appreci-
ation that war and violence are not discrete spatial
events but merge into contorted landscapes of security
and insecurity (Philo 2012; Woodward 2013; Fluri
2014). The emerging interest in the geopolitics of
nature and climate change reflects rising concerns
The Violent Geographies of the VietnamWar and the Rise of Drone Warfare 5
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about life in the age of what some have labeled the
Anthropocene (see Dalby 2013). This sensitivity to
the planet draws our attention to forms of violence
that can fester and rot long after wars are won and
lost. So although violence can be fast and subjective,
as with the genocides that slaughter thousands within
weeks, other times it can be slow and infrastructural
(Nevins 2009).
Geography was very much active in the execution
of state violence throughout the VietnamWar. Half of
South Vietnam’s entire forested land was damaged by
bombs, bulldozers, and chemical weapons (Westing
1983). In this kind of an ecological war, the atmo-
sphere becomes the space, or medium, of terror. The
U.S. military sought to reengineer the physical atmos-
pheres of Vietnam into an abstract warscape that was
knowable, mappable, and bombable. At times, all
forms of life, human or nonhuman, were considered
fair game inside the U.S. military’s enclosure. As Slo-
terdijk (2009, 25) wrote, this form of atmospheric ter-
ror, “from an environmental perspective, voids the
distinction between violence against people and vio-
lence against things: it comprises a form of violence
against the very human-ambient ‘things’ without
which people cannot remain people.”
In 1972, Yves Lacoste, a French geographer,
investigated claims that the U.S. Air Force was
deliberately bombing North Vietnam’s irrigation
systems under what he termed geographical warfare.
By targeting the country’s dikes, “a primordial geo-
graphical condition of existence for the people,”
Lacoste (1973) argued “that these bombings were
designed to precipitate a frightening catastrophe”
(3). This attempt to flood the landscape marshaled
a form of state power that targeted and terrorized
the enemy’s environment directly. So although geo-
graphic warfare was by no means unprecedented
(Peluso and Vandergeest 2011), its systematic
deployment by the U.S. military marks a distinct
amplification.
In addition to U.S. bombing campaigns in the
north—such as Operation Rolling Thunder (1965–
1968) and Operation Linebacker I and II (1972)—the
U.S. Air Force routinely struck South Vietnam, Laos,
and Cambodia. By the end of the war, approximately
21 million bomb craters pockmarked South Vietnam’s
landscape (Gibson 2000, 225). B-52 Arc Light bomb-
ing missions could leave a trail of destruction that was
miles long. These craters then became flooded in the
tropical Mekong Delta region, acting as breeding
grounds for mosquitos and diseases. “Huge numbers of
rice paddies, orchards, farms, and gardens were lost to
cultivation. This led to rampant soil erosion and weed
invasion, destroyed wildlife habitats, and played havoc
with the countryside’s intricate irrigation systems”
(Turse 2013, 93). Shrapnel also punctured tree bark,
leading to the growth of wood-rotting fungi (Westing
1975). In total, 9,000 out of 15,000 rural villages in
South Vietnam were destroyed (Westing 1983).
Nearly 10.5 million people abandoned their homes
because their rural livelihoods were destroyed (Gibson
2000).
One of the most controversial elements of the
Vietnam War was the use of chemical defoliants
such as Agent Orange. The U.S. military’s defolia-
tion program aimed to strip the forests of life,
reducing the cover for the NLF, particularly along
the Ho Chi Minh Trail. This was the main logisti-
cal network of supplies to the South that wound
through Laos and Cambodia. Around 72 million lit-
ers of herbicide were dumped across South Viet-
nam, including 42 million liters of Agent Orange
(Palmer 2005). This spraying represented around a
seventh of South Vietnam’s total land area (Gibson
2000). The first defoliation flights took place on 28
November 1961. The Air Force modified UC-123
aircraft for the missions, which became part of
Operation Ranch Hand, lasting until 1971
(Frankum 2006; see Figure 3). For years following
the spraying, only uncultivable plants would grow
in extensive white zones. When wildlife wasn’t
deliberately targeted by the U.S. military—as it
Figure 3. UC-123 aircraft on a defoliation flight as part of Opera-
tion Ranch Hand. Source: National Museum of the U.S. Air Force,
Identifier Number 071002-F-1234P-022. Available in Wikipedia
Commons (https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/9/
96/’Ranch_Hand’_run.jpg). (Color figure available online.)
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sometimes was in the case of water buffalo (West-
ing 1983; see also Turse 2013)—it was unable to
survive in these deathly ecosystems. Residual diox-
ins from Agent Orange are still responsible for a
number of congenital health problems (see Palmer
2005; Ngo et al. 2006; Wilcox 2011).
U.S. soldiers carrying flamethrowers, and later
Phantom and B-52 airplanes, delivered approximately
400,000 tons of napalm during the war, with fires rav-
aging around 100,000 acres of forested land (Turse
2013). Beyond chemical weapons, sometimes the
destruction of forests was achieved more mechanically.
Approximately 1,200 square miles of forest were bull-
dozed by Rome plows, which were 33,000-kg armored
tractors. In total, they tore up approximately 2 percent
of the entire land area of the South (Westing 1975).
Furthermore, an experimental program of weather
warfare was developed. U.S aircraft released photoflash
cartridges inside of clouds to trigger the release of
moisture. Industrial-scale atmospheric power had
arrived in Southeast Asia. Yet ironically, “typhoon-
induced rains interfered with cloud seeding, cooling
the earth and preventing the updrafts of heated air
that were essential to the project” (Nalty 2005, 33).
This practice of climatic modification was later
banned in a 1977 UN Convention.
Finally, the use of tear gas represents a more inti-
mate attack against and through the atmosphere. The
U.S. military began equipping South Vietnamese
troops with what were then termed riot control gases
in 1962, under its Military Assistance Program. U.S.
Marines, in turn, first used tear gas during the 1965
Operation STOMP in Qui Nhon. Because NLF tun-
nels were extremely dangerous places for U.S. and
South Vietnamese troops to crawl into (a practice car-
ried out by so-called tunnel rats), “it soon became
standard practice to throw tear-gas grenades into the
entrance and . . . force the gas down into the recesses
of the tunnel” (Ellison 2011, 50).
One of the ironies about the use of tear gas was how
quickly it boomeranged back to the U.S. homeland,
where it was used against anti–Vietnam War protes-
tors at Berkeley. Since the Vietnam War, tear gas has
become an important weapon for securing the urban
environment across the planet (Nieuwenhuis 2013).
By flooding the urban volume with a toxic cloud of
chemicals, the state seizes the territory that protestors
occupy and converts it into a hostile milieu. As Fei-
genbaum and Kanngieser (2015, 81) argued,
“Atmospheric policing refers to those technologies
and techniques for controlling populations that are
fundamentally predicated on their relationship with
air . . . they colonize space in ways that other weapons
do not.” Tear-gassing is a biopolitical war launched
against and through the atmosphere. “By using vio-
lence against the very air that groups breath, the
human being’s immediate atmospheric envelope is
transformed into something whose intactness or non-
intactness is henceforth a question” (Sloterdijk 2009,
25). Here, then, state power is enforced directly on
bare animal surfaces—in the lungs of unwilling sub-
jects. Biological tissue becomes a target and partici-
pant in atmospheric war.
Electronic Enclosure
Atmospheric warfare has so far been synonymous
with methods of state power that seek to destroy and
rework the lived environment. But atmospheric war-
fare cannot be restricted to thinking about the circula-
tions of biological life—as if atmospheres are nothing
more than the bubbles that envelop living organisms
in the natural kingdom (i.e., Uexk€ull 2010). Atmos-
pheres are equally technological. I therefore want to
broaden how an atmosphere is understood to encom-
pass the electromagnetic spheres that enclose, code,
and secure the circulation of life. The idea of
(remotely) sensing the atmosphere through electronic
machinery is crucial to this section, which traces how
a battlefield suffused with networked sensors came to
exploit the atmosphere for surveillance and control.
The Vietnam War was history’s first “Technowar”
according to Gibson (2000). This is defined as a tech-
nologically intensive, managerial conflict, fought with
spreadsheets and statistics as much as soldiers and
bombs. A crucial figure in realizing Technowar was
Robert Strange McNamara, the Secretary of Defense
during the early years of the Vietnam War. Along
with ex-RAND systems analysts, his aim was to trans-
form the military into a corporatized, machinistic sys-
tem. “There was to be no ‘fog of war’ for his Pentagon”
(Turse 2013, 42). The complicated lives of humans
were converted into streams of data, part of the cyber-
netic revolution that was sweeping across the Penta-
gon. “The cybernetic model of warfare erected by the
system analysts was one that was frictionless, a per-
fectly oiled machine resting on elegant mathematical
constructs” (Bousquet 2009, 161).
In the summer of 1966, a group of U.S. scientists
were charged with reviewing Vietnam War strategy.
The Jasons, as they were known, concluded that
The Violent Geographies of the VietnamWar and the Rise of Drone Warfare 7
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Rolling Thunder was a strategic failure. They proposed
replacing it with a gigantic fence across the southern
belt of the demilitarized zone and into the Laotian
panhandle. This was designed to interdict the flow of
men and resources along the Ho Chi Minh Trail. The
Senate Armed Services Committee named this the
“electronic battlefield” (U.S. Senate 1971). The first
segment of the electronic battlefield proposed was a
ground barrier constructed with an assemblage of fire-
bases, outposts, sensors, barbed wire, trip lines, and
landmines, which stretched inland from the South
China Sea for about nineteen miles (Staaveren 1993).
Igloo White was the name of the second segment of
the electronic battlefield and was a virtual barrier that
used electronic sensors to remotely track the move-
ment of enemy troops through Laos and Vietnam.
Once a sensor detected a stimulus in the surrounding
atmosphere—such as the sound of a passing truck, a
vibration in the ground, the chemical “smell” of an
NLF soldier, or even a change in light—it broadcasted
a radio signal to nearby ground and air receivers,
including Lockheed EC-121 planes. These signals
were then relayed through the atmosphere to the U.S.
Infiltration Surveillance Center at Nakhon Phanom
in Thailand. This 20,000-square-foot operations hub,
known as Task Force Alpha, was the nerve center of
Igloo White, staffed by around 400 Air Force person-
nel (Nalty 2005).
Two IBM 360–65 super-computers processed the
incoming sensor information. Strings of activated sen-
sors would light up across a map display in the war
room. These illuminated patterns became known as
worms, and were used to determine the time that
human and truck convoys would arrive at a predeter-
mined strike zone. As Dickson (2012, 85) noted,
sometimes the pilot of these planes would “not even
push the button that dropped the bombs—like so
much else in Igloo White this was automated with the
bombs released at the movement selected by the
computer.”
From beginning to end, the enemy of the electronic
battlefield existed as an abstract signal generated by
remote sensors. Igloo White installed a sophisticated
radio enclosure, a self-referential atmosphere of com-
puter algorithms, automated gunships, and electronic
worms. “At the point when Technowar reaches its
technological apex, it turns completely into a repre-
sentation. Indeed, the very name for a ‘target’ was
‘target signature’” (Gibson 2000, 397). To U.S. military
analysts sitting in Thailand, human lives and deaths
were viewed as illuminated simulacra. In 1972, Eric
Herter, a U.S. veteran of the Vietnam War, claimed
that the electronic battlefield was “an automated elec-
tronic and mechanical death machine.” He continued,
“We have seen the mechanical monster, the mindless
devastation, the agony of simple people caught in the
fire storm of our technological rampage” (quoted in
Dickson 2012, 208–09).
During President Nixon’s so-called war on drugs,
the U.S.–Mexico border became a crucial testing
ground for the electronic battlefield. Seismic sensors
were used by the U.S. Border Patrol in the summer of
1970 to monitor illegal border crossings (Clawson
1970), together with Air Force Pave Eagle remotely
piloted aircraft. As Barkan (1972, 619) observed,
“Vietnam’s $3250 million automated battlefield is
coming home to America, the land where it was con-
ceived. Though they may not know it, many Ameri-
cans are already being watched.” This atmospheric
form of security continues today, with fleets of Preda-
tor drones orbiting the U.S. borderlands—together
with billions of dollars spent on virtual fences in the
desert. Both are embodiments of the same kind of
hope and hubris poured into Igloo White. By the close
of the Vietnam War, the Pentagon was investing mil-
lions into electronic battlefield programs. Igloo White
was thus the trigger for a growing revolution in mili-
tary affairs, centered around the idea of network-cen-
tric warfare (Cebrowski and Garstka 1998; Deitchman
2008). Crucially, the electronic battlefield enabled the
U.S. military to globalize its battlespace, to install a
networked sensor-shooter system that brought the
planet’s undulating topographies inside its machinic
topologies.
This was the beginning of a completely digitized
battlespace, an electronic enclosure big enough to
place the Earth’s vast oceans and skies inside. In 1975,
The New York Times ran a story on this brave new
world, prophesizing, “Wars fought by planes without
pilots, between armies that may never see each other
except as blips on an oscilloscope” (Stanford 1975,
12). In another forward-looking piece, Newsweek pre-
dicted, “By the 1980s . . . the President will be able to
order up a television overview of battlegrounds, to sur-
vey damage to both American and enemy cities and to
evaluate potential target areas” (“Visions of the Next
War” 1974, 53). This future has, of course, come to
pass. A range of global apparatuses, from satellites and
drones orbiting the planet, to National Security
Agency (NSA) listening posts, now produce an
increasingly totalizing form of atmospheric surveil-
lance, forming what I’ve elsewhere called a “Predator
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Empire” (Shaw 2013; see also Engelhardt 2011; Scahill
2013).
By converting the uncertainty of the warscape into
an electronic battlefield, the U.S. military’s Igloo
White project also foregrounded the pattern of life
analysis that would come to define the CIA’s drone
program of targeted killing in Pakistan (Shaw and
Akhter 2012). U.S. analysts from Task Force Alpha in
Thailand, plotting the geographic trajectory of elec-
tronic worms using analog technologies, were conduct-
ing a simplistic form of signals intelligence (SIGINT)
and geographical intelligence (GEOINT) that CIA
and NSA analysts would build upon decades later. In
particular, the movement from analog to digital war-
fare dates back to an important period following the
Gulf War. In the summer of 1994, the Army Science
Board Summer Study Panel reviewed the Army’s tech-
nological capabilities and began a series of experi-
ments in digital war under the name Force XXI.
Today, the U.S. intelligence community regularly
uses GEOINT and SIGINT to plot the space–time
trajectories of targeted individuals. One of the most
sophisticated geographic information systems (GIS)
used by the military is GeoTime, which allows an
analyst to map temporal data, so that patterns over
space and time can be discerned. This represents a
transition from feature-based to activity-based intel-
ligence (see Crampton, Roberts, and Poorthuis
2014). Underlying this evolution has been a prolif-
eration in computational forms of governance under
what Amoore (2009) called algorithmic warfare.
Automated GIS tracking systems must be capable
of finding and fixing suspicious spatial trajectories
among billions of pieces of information. This algo-
rithmic calculation aims to locate dangerous pat-
terns of life, a “militarized rhythmanalysis, even a
weaponized time-geography” (Gregory 2011a, 195).
If such biopolitical signatures are defined as danger-
ous—often through their association with known or
suspected terrorists—they can be subsequently elim-
inated in a so-called signature (drone) strike (Shaw
2013).
Signature strikes represent an evolution of state
power away from fixed sovereign territorialities and
citizen subjects, to a globalized biopolitics of security
based on targeting emergent patterns of life, in which
“subjectivities, boundaries, and territory are compre-
hensively reconfigured” (Dillon 2007, 17). In other
words, state power is not simply exercised across disci-
plinary enclosures (Foucault 1977) marked by insides
and outsides, friends and enemies. “The production of
this form of individuality belongs neither to discipline
nor to control but to something else: to targeting in its
most contemporary procedures, whose formal features
are shared today among fields as diverse as policing,
military reconnaissance and marketing” (Chamayou
2014). Contemporary state power circulates among
diffuse atmospheres with uncertain boundaries and tar-
gets threatening patterns of life. These are porous, rov-
ing volumes that complicate traditional ideas of
sovereignty, territory, and subjectivity.
Counterinsurgency and the Phoenix
Program
The third form of atmospheric security I want to
investigate is centered on the bureaucratic forms of
power that came to define U.S. counterinsurgency.
Although very much grounded in a material infra-
structure, U.S. pacification and counterinsurgency was
constellated through a variety of symbolic regimes,
bureaucratic protocols, and cultural dispositions. As
with the electronic battlefield, atmospheric warfare
can exercise a certain psychological power over those
caught in its volumes: Both practitioners and targets
are forced to dwell beneath the same semiotic sky.
Although it was not widely appreciated at the time,
many believe that the U.S. military lost the Vietnam
War because of how it routinely misunderstood the
importance of village life, as both a wellspring of iden-
tity and insurgency. The village and the land that it
occupied were sacred to many Vietnamese people,
connecting them to their ancestors in an undying spir-
itual constant (Fitzgerald 1972). Moreover, the village
was the principal source of NLF power: Due to its dis-
persed and decentralized organization across hamlets
big and small, the NLF was nearly impossible to erase.
This meant that the average Vietnamese peasant
played a delicate balancing act between Saigon and
NLF cadres. “For most Americans in Vietnam, the
dynamics of the Vietnamese villager’s dilemma were
impossible to grasp” (Herrington 1982, 53).
The U.S. pivot toward pacification and away from
search-and-destroy missions came after a series of fail-
ures in South Vietnam. The Strategic Hamlet pro-
gram, for example, was modeled on British
counterinsurgency in Malaya, where the practice of
“winning hearts and minds” was developed (see
Belcher 2012). Sir Robert Thompson was head of the
British Advisory Mission to South Vietnam and rec-
ommended securing existing villages with barbed wire
The Violent Geographies of the VietnamWar and the Rise of Drone Warfare 9
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and bamboo fencing. Under Diem, however, the Stra-
tegic Hamlet program forcibly relocated communities
to agrovilles. Moreover, the land outside these fortified
archipelagos could be—and was—declared as free-fire
zones that were subject to random artillery fire in a
practice known as harassment and interdiction. Need-
less to say, the resettlement program was a disaster:
“the circle of artillery and barbed wire enclosed a polit-
ical void that waited for the NLF” (Fitzgerald, 1972,
125). The Strategic Hamlet strategy waned after the
military coup against Diem in 1963, but U.S. manage-
ment of the war increased the outpouring of villagers
to overcrowded urban areas, which became de facto
Strategic Hamlets.
Although U.S. counterinsurgency can be traced
back to the military’s occupation of the Philippines
(McCoy 2009b) and documents such as the
Marines’ Small Wars Manual of 1940, it was under
the direction of Robert Komer that a widespread
program of counterinsurgency was pursued. This
was institutionalized in the 1967 Civil Operations
and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS)
program. This was a joint military and civil pro-
gram that acted as an umbrella for all the various
pacification programs run across South Vietnam. Its
aim was to win hearts and minds through various
social and rural programs, as well as dismantling
the political apparatus of the NLF—variously
labeled as the Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI) or
shadow government—that existed across the coun-
tryside. The system was heavily computerized. The
Hamlet Evaluation Scheme, for example, required
district-level advisers to input eighteen separate
quantitative metrics to generate the average value
of pacification in each hamlet.
By this time, there was a range of different agen-
cies in South Vietnam producing intelligence on
the NLF. The CIA was thus eager to create a uni-
fied anti-infrastructure intelligence program. The
result was the Infrastructure Coordination and
Exploitation (ICEX) program. ICEX was signed
into law in December 1967 by President Thieu,
who named it Phung Hoang, the All-Seeing Bird,
which was translated to Phoenix. Officially, the
program sought to neutralize—that is, capture, kill,
or convert—the so-called VCI. Sir Robert Thomp-
son had long recommended that Phoenix be made
a police responsibility, citing British counterinsur-
gency in Malaya, Palestine, and Cyprus (Hunt
1995). As such, Thieu’s decree enlarged Special
Branch’s responsibility for anti-infrastructure
operations. This was to be a bureaucratic “machine”
that maintained target folders and blacklists of
known communist cadres (Valentine 2000, 131).
Although the Phoenix Program was baptized under
CORDS, its precedents stem from the counterterror
(CT) teams recruited by the CIA in the early 1960s.
For years, the agency had overseen secretive hunter-
killer teams under the Mountain Scout Program.
Instead of winning hearts and minds like CORDS, the
CIA’s strategy—pioneered by Saigon CIA station
chief Peer De Silva—was to mirror the political and
psychological tactics of the NLF, creating “an instru-
ment of civilian terror” (Fitzgerald 1972, 412). Around
4,000 CT teams were formed, supported by Special
Forces and the CIA, and divided into teams of a dozen
or so members. Years before U.S. troops officially
landed in Vietnam, “increasing numbers of American
Special Forces were in South Vietnam, practicing the
terrifying black art of psychological warfare” (Valen-
tine 2000, 34). The CIA’s CT teams were later
rebadged as Provincial Reconnaissance Units (PRUs)
and became the main action arms of Phoenix along-
side the South Vietnamese police. Although the PRU
members were chosen, trained, and paid for by the
CIA, the Pentagon later distanced itself from PRUs
(Hunt 1995).
A second component of Phoenix was interrogation
(Figure 4). At each South Vietnamese province, a
Province Interrogation Center (PIC) was constructed,
again funded and supervised by the CIA. These formed
a carcereal archipelago of de facto black sites across
Figure 4. A suspected National Liberation Front prisoner awaits
interrogation at a Special Forces Detachment close to Da Nang
in 1967. Source: U.S. National Archives, Identifier Number
531447. High-resolution image taken from Wikimedia Commons
(https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Vietconginterrogation
1967.jpg?uselangDen-gb).
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South Vietnam. These overcrowded centers were
alleged to be the locations of crimes carried out by
South Vietnamese officials, including rape; gang rape;
rape using eels, snakes, and other hard objects; rape
followed by murder; electrical shock; water boarding;
dog mauling; and beatings (Valentine 2000). The U.S.
Army, investigating the testimony of one Phoenix
operative, K. Barton Osborn, “did not challenge
Osborn’s overall sense of Phoenix’s systematic brutal-
ity” (McCoy 2012, 98). Tens of thousands of men,
women, and children passed through these bleak inter-
rogation rooms. Innocent individuals could, and were,
blacklisted by specious allegations. Tragically, as one
Pentagon study confirmed, most intelligence gained
was of negligible importance (Mayer 2007).
The efficacy and notoriety of Phoenix as a counter-
terrorist operation varied across South Vietnam’s many
districts. Its legacy remains defended and derided, but it
was undoubtedly open to abuse. For close to fifteen
years, U.S. advisors in South Vietnam outsourced dirty
war missions and assassinations against the communist
infrastructure to PRUs and other paramilitaries that
operated outside of direct U.S. supervision. According
to the CIA’s own figures, anti-infrastructure operations
neutralized around 80,000members of the VCI (Finlay-
son 2007). Although estimates vary, and the true num-
ber will never be known, perhaps as many as 46,000
people were killed under the program (McCoy 2009a).
Like the Hamlet Evaluation System, Phoenix was
heavily computerized and used sophisticated computer
information banks to centralize data (McCoy 2012).
The introduction of computation into the Vietnam
War was hardly a neutral or objective technology of
course but, like the electronic battlefield, articulated
the conditions through which populations were ren-
dered intelligible to state power (Belcher 2016).
Beginning in 1968, the Viet Cong Infrastructure Infor-
mation System—later rebadged the Phung Hoang
Management Information System—collated popula-
tion data from the Defense Intelligence Agency, the
FBI, and the CIA, together with other agencies across
South Vietnam. “At that point the era of the comput-
erized blacklist began” (Valentine 2000, 259).
It is in this sense that Phoenix, together with
CORDS, was an atmospheric form of warfare. Its
computational methods of neutralization reinforced
the wider conceits of U.S. counterinsurgency and elec-
tronic warfare, creating a self-referential world, or a
technological enclosure, through which blacklisted
individuals and U.S. war managers were hailed as
technological subjects of pacification. Atmospheric
power thus includes the affects, habits, and subjects
that are enveloped by the interior spaces of the war
machine. The Vietnam War witnessed two worlds col-
lide: technological modernism and ancient Confucian-
ism. “In a sense there was no more correspondence
between the two worlds than that between the atmo-
sphere of the earth and that of sea” (Fitzgerald 1972,
7). Atmospheric power surrounded its practitioners in
a cocoon of bureaucratic power no less than the com-
munities terrorized across South Vietnam. In both
cases, a psychological power saturated the atmosphere.
An atmosphere thus disrupts the dichotomy
between individual and environment, biology and
technology. Both subject and object exist in shifting
halos of more-than-human force relations. Such
atmospheres “occur before and alongside the formation
of subjectivity, across human and nonhuman materi-
alities, and in-between subject/object distinctions”
(Anderson 2009, 78). An atmosphere can therefore
be understood as the space of an objective dis-
charge—an existential envelope in which the organic
is mediated, transferred, and extended by the inor-
ganic. “It is in this sense that the what invents the
who just as much as it is invented by it” (Stiegler
1998, 177). In other words, atmospheric warfare cre-
ates pacified interiors composed of humans and non-
humans. Enclosed by artificial husks, these
hypersecured spaces can blind bureaucrats no less
than they can terrorize targets.
The Phoenix Program also feeds directly into the
most sophisticated program of U.S. atmospheric war-
fare to date: dronified manhunting. Killing by kill list,
in which war managers select targets for assassination
from a computerized database, exploded during the
war on terror. This was crystallized in the so-called dis-
position matrix of the Obama administration (Shaw
and Akhter 2014). This violent geography of man-
hunting is mapped next.
The Phoenix Rises in the War on Terror
Project X was the code name for the Army’s Foreign
Intelligence Assistance Program (Priest 1997). The
aim of Project X was to transcribe the counterinsur-
gency and interrogation techniques from the Phoenix
Program into a set of training manuals for Latin Amer-
ican governments in the 1970s and 1980s. Project X
materials were distributed to guide anticommunist
forces in prisoner interrogation, surveillance, wiretap-
ping, assassination, and even the use of truth serum
The Violent Geographies of the VietnamWar and the Rise of Drone Warfare 11
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 G
las
go
w]
 at
 03
:26
 02
 Fe
br
ua
ry
 20
16
 
(sodiopentathol). “By the mid-1980s, counterguerilla
operations in Columbia and Central America would
thus bear an eerie but explicable resemblance to those
in South Vietnam” (McCoy 2012, 100). The exact
contents of the Army’s Project X materials are difficult
to assess, because most were destroyed by the Penta-
gon. Nonetheless, Phoenix-derived methods—embod-
ied in seven Spanish-speaking training manuals—were
taught at the U.S. Army’s School of Americas. Many
of its 60,000 graduates have been implicated in atroci-
ties across Latin America (Monbiot 2001).
Project X methods were later revived in the war on
terror (see National Security Archive 2014), where
both the CIA and Special Forces implemented extra-
judicial practices. “Under the pressure of the occupa-
tion of Iraq in 2003, these brutal interrogation policies
were revived and quickly proliferated to involve thou-
sands of ordinary Iraqis” (McCoy 2012, 103). Indeed,
at the outset of the war on terror, Donald Rumsfeld
and his staff detailed a vision for a global conflict based
on hunting individuals outside of traditional military
channels. As the former Secretary of Defense stated,
“A manhunt is certainly not what the armed forces of
the United States are organized, trained, and equipped
to do. We may have to learn to do that and we are
indeed learning to do it” (Rumsfeld 2002). Some CIA
and Pentagon officials came to view the Phoenix Pro-
gram as an explicit model for the war on terror (Mayer
2007). The CIA subsequently became “a killing
machine, an organization consumed with man
hunting” (Mazzetti 2013, 4).
Yet as the war on terror progressed, Special Forces
would soon come to spearhead the manhunt, leaving
the CIA to focus on drone strikes in Pakistan’s tribal
areas. Beginning in 2003, during the U.S. occupation
of Iraq, a program of “preemptive manhunting” began
(Hersh 2003). This targeted Ba’ath Party members
and was partly designed to terrorize people into sub-
mission. According to Valentine (2003), this was “the
point of Preemptive Manhunting, just as it was the
point of the CIA’s Phoenix Program.” As the war on
terror continued, a Phoenix-style manhunt moved
from the periphery to the center of U.S. national secu-
rity. Under Stanley McChrystal’s command, Special
Forces in Iraq, and the Joint Special Operations Com-
mand (JSOC) in particular, were moved to the front-
lines of a clandestine manhunt. The sharp end of this
knife was Task Force 121. These teams had the author-
ity to assassinate insurgents without further govern-
mental approval, much like the CIA’s CT teams in
Vietnam.
JSOC operatives also ran a program of black sites
authorized under the covert Greystone program. So
bad was the torture at one facility that the CIA with-
drew its interrogators (Scahill 2013). Afghanistan was
not much different than Iraq: JSOC maintained its
own blacklist of people to kill or capture. John Nagl, a
former counterinsurgency adviser to General Petraeus,
described JSOC’s campaign as “an almost industrial-
scale counterterrorism killing machine” (quoted in
Gavett 2011).
The practice of manhunting has since come to
define U.S. drone warfare, which has entrenched a
cartography of killing based on an amorphous bat-
tlespace populated by dangerous patterns of life,
rather than discrete battlefields with national mili-
taries. Manhunting is “an invasive power based not
so much on the rights of conquest as on the rights
of pursuit: a right of universal intrusion or
encroachment that would authorize charging after
the prey wherever it found refuge, thereby tram-
pling underfoot the principle of territorial integrity
classically attached to state sovereignty” (Cha-
mayou 2015, 53). And so, from blacklist to kill list,
from black site to black site, and from hunter to
Predator, the specters of the Vietnam War swirl
across an increasingly “dronified” U.S. national
security. The Phoenix Program left a winding docu-
ment trail that connected Vietnam with Central
America, Iraq, and Afghanistan.
The Crystallization of Drone Warfare
The Vietnam War birthed the most sophisticated
program of drone surveillance in the history of flight,
which, together with the electronic battlefield,
“prefigure the technical infrastructure for today’s drone
wars” (Gregory 2011b). If modernity is the process of
bringing atmospheres under surveillance and security
(Sloterdijk 2013), then drone warfare crystallizes the
longue duree of these trends. Atmospheric power—no
longer bound to the horizontal, the network, or the
surface—targets and occupies the shape-shifting vol-
umes of human coexistence. It is in this sense that
“security produces atmospheres and it even becomes
atmospherically distributed and immersive” (Adey
2014, 835).
The Cold War backdrop spurred the development
of drones, which offered the U.S. military visual access
to denied and dangerous spaces. In 1960, Francis Gary
Powers was shot down over the Soviet Union while
12 Shaw
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 G
las
go
w]
 at
 03
:26
 02
 Fe
br
ua
ry
 20
16
 
piloting a U-2 spy plane. As a result, the Eisenhower
administration scrambled to replace its manned
reconnaissance program. In 1962, the year of the
Cuban missile crisis, Ryan Aeronautical Company was
given money from the U.S. Air Force’s Big Safari
research funds to develop surveillance drones. Ryan
went on to modify its jet-powered Firebees, creating a
family of drones that went by several designations:
Ryan 147, AQM-34, and the commonly used Light-
ning Bug (Figure 5). Launched from a Lockheed DC-
130 Hercules airplane, the Lightning Bugs flew pre-
programmed routes or were piloted by Airborne
Remote Control Officers on board the Hercules. After
performing their surveillance mission, the Lightning
Bugs deployed their parachutes and were scooped up
by helicopters under the guidance of Drone Recovery
Officers. The Lightning Bugs were flown under the
auspices of the U.S. Strategic Air Command and were
used for surveillance across a wide Cold War battle-
space, including Cuba, North Korea, and the People’s
Republic of China. Between 1964 and 1975, Lightning
Bugs flew more than 3,500 combat sorties in Vietnam
(Ehrhard 2010).
The development of drones was also driven by the
exigencies of the Vietnam War. Sophisticated North
Vietnamese aerial defenses, together with monsoon
weather, pushed pilots to fly at higher and higher alti-
tudes. And so, under Big Hunter missions, Lightning
Bugs were used as replacements to manned missions,
“relying on their speed and small size to elude heavy
and effective North Vietnamese defenses” (Comptrol-
ler General of the United States 1981, 2). According
to Colonel John Dale, director of the Strategic Air
Command’s 15th Air Force headquarters, “One of the
things that is not said anywhere is, from October 1968
to November 1972—four years—we were the only air-
craft flying in North Vietnam” (quoted in Orr 2014).
More than 1,000 Lightning Bugs were eventually built,
costing $250 million a year to maintain (Ehrhard
2010).
By the end of the Vietnam War, U.S. surveillance
drones were fitted with long range aid to navigation
(LORAN) technology, which drastically improved
their reconnaissance capabilities. The Air Force subse-
quently launched the Compass Cope program in the
1970s to increase the range and endurance of drones.
Yet the 1980s actually saw government funding for
drones fall. Reasons varied, including what some
labeled a propilot bias in the Air Force (Comptroller
of the United States 1981). The 1990s, however, trig-
gered a resurgence in interest in drones. The Balkan
conflicts placed an increased importance on aerial sur-
veillance and dynamic forms of targeting.
In 1994, under the codename LOFTY VIEW, the
CIA operated the GNAT-750 drone in secrecy over
Bosnia. According to the CIA director, “I could sit in
my office, call up a classified channel and in an early
version of e-mail type messages to a guy in Albania
asking him to zoom in on things” (quoted in Finn
2011). The GNAT-750 was subsequently upgraded
with a satellite data link, becoming the Predator drone
synonymous with the war on terror today. Under
Operation Allied Force, the Predator was used to pro-
vide targeting intelligence for NATO and U.S. air
Figure 5. U.S. Air Force AQM-34L Firebee drone, 1969. Source: Taken from Wikipedia Commons (https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/
File:556th_RS_AQM-34_Drone.jpg?uselangDen-gb). (Color figure available online.)
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strikes over Kosovo. In 2001 the Big Safari office suc-
cessfully fitted an antitank Hellfire missile under the
wings of the Predator. The hunter was now a killer;
“the remote-controlled age had begun, and the killer
drones became an object of fascination inside the
CIA” (Mazzetti 2013, 100).
Unlike the Vietnam-era drones, the slower Predator
can loiter for much longer, sending real-time satellite
imagery to the other side of the planet. The Predator
drone, perhaps more than any other robotic weapon, is
a concrete symbol of a form of electronic enclosure
that annihilates distance through technology, multi-
plying the reach of state power through an atmo-
spheric topology. Sophisticated apparatuses of aerial
capture are now productive of enveloping and immer-
sive security atmospheres (Adey 2014) that surveil
and pacify the human lifeworld.
With drone warfare in particular, we can understand
how the atmosphere is directly targeted and secured.
As Feigenbaum and Kanngieser (2015, 83) argued,
“Atmospheres of terror are built through the escalation
of military governance into the air in which everyday
life is enveloped.” By occupying the sky with drones—
often for days, months, and years at a time—a form of
terror saturates the volume below like an insidious fog.
“People are afraid of dying,” said one shopkeeper in
Pakistan’s tribal areas, a region that has been frequently
targeted by CIA drone strikes. “Children, women, they
are all psychologically affected. They look at the sky to
see if there are drones” (quoted in International Human
Rights and Conflict Resolution Clinic at Stanford Law
School and Global Justice Clinic at NYU School of
Law 2012, 151).
The drone is thus a crucial machine for performing
a kind of spheric hacking. By this, I mean that the psy-
chological “mood” of an atmosphere is modulated by
the technical infrastructures that pervade it. Military
drones access the phenomenological profiles of hostile
spheres to reconfigure and incarcerate them within the
imperial geometries of electronic enclosure, trans-
ducing what is seen, heard, said, and felt. The drone is
an atmospheric weapon then, not simply because it
moves through the skies and enforces a vertical power
but because it modulates the atmosphere. The drone,
in other words, polices the phenomenological struc-
ture of the world it haunts (Shaw 2012). Unmanned
robots, legacies of the Vietnam War no less than the
electronic battlefield, reconstitute the transcendental
logic of the atmospheres they stalk, policing—or sim-
ply destroying—the biopolitical climate of their
interiors.
Conclusion: An Enclosed Technological
Civilization
Revisiting the violent geographies of the Vietnam
War is important for many reasons, not least of which
is to revisit a conflict that underwrites the war on ter-
ror, and drone warfare in particular. State power has
been, and always will be, invested in managing the
spaces of life: the geographies that bind biology and
technology in moving atmospheres. As this article has
insisted, such atmospheres must be understood as
politically charged volumes. An atmosphere is a space
of psychopolitical enclosure beyond the air that we
breathe, the soil we dig, or the climate that envelops
us. It is a more-than-human volume of technology,
electronic mediation, and aerial policing. This compli-
cates current compositions about biopolitics without
evacuating the centrality of state power in securing
the spatial conditions of people, objects, and affects.
In short, atmospheric warfare targets the hybrid forms
of human and nonhuman coexistence and encloses
them within the interior worlds of the war machine.
The Vietnam War marked a crucial moment in the
development of atmospheric warfare. Ecological vio-
lence, Igloo White, the Phoenix Program, and drone
surveillance each produced a spatiality of conflict that
shared an atmospheric DNA. Whether this was a
chemical power, an electronic power, a bureaucratic
power, or an aerial power, all were designed to pacify
and enclose hostile circulations of life. If, to repeat
Sloterdijk (2013), “biopolitics begins as enclosure-
building” (170), then we can expand the idea of enclo-
sure building to the organic and inorganic apparatuses
of state power. An armada of war machines operated
on the landscape of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.
Sometimes the target was people. Other times the aim
was simply to destroy the forest.
In any case, rather than being passive ingredients
of an atmosphere, objects modify the biopolitical cli-
mate of their interiors. Atmospheres emanate around
human and nonhuman objects, condensing into
shape-shifting affective halos. In this sense, an atmo-
sphere is the space of an objective, as well as subjec-
tive, structure of experience; a volumetric order
constituted by nonhuman discharges of force.
Assemblages of nonhuman actors constantly produce,
protect, and police bubbles of biopolitical sense. In
turn, state power is fundamentally invested in this
process of atmospheric transduction: the very passage
through which the atmosphere is modulated. Some-
times, this includes a form of atmospheric power that
14 Shaw
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envelops but does not touch. Drone warfare is an
important example of modern security in which dan-
gerous patterns of life are immersed within a volumi-
nous technogeography without physical containment.
Indeed, drone warfare has come to symbolize a
fundamentally enclosed technological civilization.
The electronic battlefield is slowly developing into
a general biopolitical condition of human being.
The need to secure the U.S. homeland has
expanded the frontiers of the electronic battlefield
to encompass the many physical and virtual spaces
of the planet. Across land, sea, and outer space,
Predators—both human and robotic—now surveil,
police, and contain the planet’s restive populations
in the kind of Predator Empire that the Washing-
ton war managers of Vietnam could have only
dreamt about. Atmospheric warfare, at its apex,
becomes a form of full-spectrum dominance, a
totalizing space of state violence, in which a hyper-
individualized manhunt takes place across diffuse
biopolitical enclosures modulated by material and
electronic infrastructures. These atmospheres are
not easily mappable, and their topological transduc-
tions defy the topographic certainties of sovereign
boundaries.
The Vietnam War therefore offers a deep, even exis-
tential reflection on the precarious link between human
existence and the environment. If we come to under-
stand our lives as inseparable from the atmospheres in
which we dwell, perhaps we would take more seriously
the toxicity of their continual securitization. Atmos-
pheres are not neutral background to human life but
the space of our subjectivity. Any attack waged against
these spheres—as the Vietnam War exposed so viscer-
ally—is a violence launched against the very essence of
the human condition.
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